MS ESTONIA: the wind is blowing because the trees are swaying*

(LGBT engineers** vs Archimedes)

I do not consider myself to be a conspiracy theorist. As per my observations, regardless of the type or scale of the conspiracy, conspiracy theorists are people who are incapable of seeing reality. The loss of sense of reality coupled together with an unhealthy imagination is exactly what lies at the base of any such theory. For those who have never participated in any kind of conspiracy, it is hard to understand that such complicated and dynamic processes, with a huge number of variables, are essentially totally unpredictable and uncontrollable. To plan and then realize the “perfect crime” on a large scale, without making any fatal mistakes, is virtually impossible.

The disaster of the ferry “Estonia”, from an objective point of view, is a combination of different separate non-critical circumstances, that all together as a sum have led to its demise. All these years, the search for the answer to the question “Why did it sink?”, mostly turned up non-coherent answers, since nobody could answer why it sank so quickly. It was the rapid rate of the sinking that signaled to everyone that apart from the known defect with the ship’s visor, there must have been other unknown faults. The rate of sinking indirectly points to the existence of holes on either ship’s sides or somewhere on the hull. It was the presence of such holes that would explain why the capsized ship could not stay afloat. controlled robot found of this exact scenario of the disaster, there was no evidence to support it, and as the sole reason explaining such a rapid capsizing and sinking of the vessel, the investigation named a completely open bow ramp, through which, in a very short time, it was possible for a significant amount of seawater to flood into the ship.

In 2019, Swedish journalist Henrik Evertsson, in collaboration with Discovery Inc, managed to mount an expedition to the ferry “Estonia”, the results of which were the basis for a 5-episode series named “Estonia: a discovery that changes everything”. The surveying of the ferry with a remote-controlled robot found a hole in the starboard of the ship, which was not known before. And since the authors of the documentary did not come to any concrete conclusions about it, I took the liberty and did it for them.

Before we move on to discussing the particulars, I would like to remind you about some important details that had a significant effect on the entire course of these tragic events.

Even during the loading in the port of Tallinn, the crew made a mistake - heavy vehicles were loaded into the stern and middle parts of the ferry without considering the distribution of their actual weight relative to the cross-section of the vessel. As indicated in the final report, under the known and expected weather conditions (strong, squally wind and waves from the port side), a heavy load should have been placed with an offset towards the port side. The shift of the transverse centre of gravity to the starboard side, and as a result, the violation of the transverse stability of the vessel, forced the crew to compensate for the resulting right list, using the left ballast tank, which was filled with water. The right ballast tank, at the moment of departure, was empty. Even considering these actions, the ship had a slight starboard list (in the range of 2-4 degrees). Section 13.2 of the final report contains a schematic of the situation made by the Maritime Academy in Kalmar, Sweden. The diagram shows the position of the vessel at certain points in time during the development of the disaster, as well as the direction of waves (wave speed was 0.5 knots) and the direction of the wind (18 meters per second).

Diagram of the movement of "Estonia" during the disaster (Final report).

As testified by one of the officers, the speed of wind on that day in the port of Tallinn was as high as 25 meters per second (according to the ship’s anemometer).

According to the diagram, the waves and wind on the night of the disaster coincided in their direction. A strong south-westerly wind (SW) was hitting the port side of the "Estonia", almost at a 90° angle, heeling her towards the starboard and "blowing" the ship off the route. To compensate for the push made by wind and waves, "Estonia" sailed with a significant drift angle. In other words, the path line (the direction to the destination) did not coincide with the true course of the ship. Alternatively, such movement of the vessel can be described as a continuous lateral sliding sideways forward. In the case of "Estonia", this continuous sliding was being done in the direction of the starboard.

It should be easy to understand that the "width of the path"(marked yellow in Pic 2) of the ship, as I so call it, will be greater, the bigger the drift angle. As a result, any floating object that is within the "width of the path" of the ship will inevitably collide with this ship. If the ship “slides” with the port side forward, then the collision will occur with the port side and vice versa.

On the night of the disaster, waves were affecting the port side of “Estonia”, if you consider their movement relative to the ship. The height of the waves, which were coming from the port side, was reaching 4-5 meters, and occasionally, according to the specialists, could even reach 8 meters. The speed of the ship was 14-15 knots. Its pitching was significantly above the acceptable levels of discomfort, which caused bouts of nausea and vomiting amongst a considerable number of passengers.

The bow of the ship, when impacting the waves, incoming from the port side, experienced not only large vertical stress (from the bottom towards the top) but also significant torsional stress (from the port towards the starboard) along the axial longitudinal line of the ship. The sum of acting factors (weakness of the locks, high speed of the ship, high waves) led to the fact that the locking devices and the swivel hinges of the visor beams could not withstand the stress and snapped. The visor (movable part of the bow that can open and close) broke off and sank.

In the files of the final report on the sinking of the ferry "Estonia", in section 12.7.3, it is indicated that the lower eyelets of the visor, which were part of the locks, were stretched and bent forward and to the right (aft or eye end of the mating lug had been elongated and bent to starboard). Moreover, in section 13.5 the following is written: “The starboard side hinge failed as a result of twisting when the visor was rotating clockwise”.

Overall, considering the conditions, as well as forces the ship was experiencing at that moment, such damage is expected and justified. However, the authors of the report, who listed these facts, somehow completely ignore them. As per their logic, what happened is that the detached visor simply fell forward and down. When falling into the water, the visor, in their opinion, received external damage, hitting the bulb which is located at the bow of the ship.

Schematic of the visor detaching from “Estonia” (Final report).

This scenario, in my opinion, seems impossible since it contradicts the facts stated earlier.

It is well known that near the front of the visor, on its right side, there is indeed an elongated dent caused by some external impact. However, I am sure that the bulb of “Estonia” has nothing to do with this damage.

The visor of «Estonia».

The right swivel hinge of the visor, which was twisted to the right (clockwise) directly hints that the visor was knocked towards the starboard side, by a large wave, that hit the port side of the ship. The broken left hinge and the destroyed fastening locks could no longer hold the visor on the bow of the ship, and the visor, under the impact of a wave that came from the port side, was blown to the right. The right pivot in this case was the turning point in the horizontal plane (clockwise twist). That is why the right hinge was twisted outward (to the right, clockwise).

Schematic of the visor detaching according to factual evidence.

To imagine a situation, where the right swivel joint was bent clockwise after the visor had detached from the ship, is essentially impossible. Such damage could not have happened even when the ship hit the seabed, as firstly, the ship was sinking with the stern first (the length of the ship is 155 meters, while the depth of the sea at that location is around 80 meters), and secondly because the location where the swivel hinge was installed is quite far away from the edge of the ship (both starboard and bow).

The visor, while falling into the water, after it has detached from the ship, collided with the starboard side of "Estonia". This blow was heard by the passengers of the cabins on the lower decks, on the starboard side. At the same time, the visor did not sink immediately, as is believed, but continued to stay afloat. Most likely, the visor, when it fell into the sea, turned around its vertical axis, because of which it was floating with the stem up.

Schematic of the fall of the visor into the water after the separation from the ship (phases from 1 to 5 are shown).

In this case, the visor acted as a dome that could hold a significant amount of air under its arch. Because the visor contains an internal strength structure (a set of frames), which separates the total volume of the visor into smaller separate cavities, the chances of significant amounts of air being trapped beneath the visor increase even more and so do the chances of it staying afloat.

In the photo beneath, the bow of “Estonia” (at that time, still Viking Sally) is shown during the repair works in a dockyard.

The visor of “Estonia” (Viking Sally) after it sustained damage from going through ice.

To check the ability of the visor to stay afloat is not that hard. The visor to this day is stored on a naval base in Sweden.

It is possible that the visor, after it separated from the ship while falling into the water, temporarily became fully submerged in seawater. But the trapped air underneath it forced it to rise back to the surface.

“Estonia”, which had a certain left drift angle (sliding forward with its starboard side), was bound to collide with its visor that was floating in front of it, as the visor had fallen towards the starboard, putting it within the path of “Estonia”. However, the nature of the damage that was possible to establish with the help of an underwater robot, during the works in 2019, indicated that the blow the ferry received to its starboard side, at the exact level of the waterline and the fender, is hardly in any way related to the visor, as it looks as if the hit came from behind the ship, towards the bow, at an angle of about 45 degrees. The width of the discovered hole in its widest part was estimated to be approximately 1.2 meters, and its length is approximately 4 meters. The shape of the hole is that of an asymmetrical triangle.

The authors of the documentary "Estonia: a discovery that changes everything" contacted several specialists for clarification on this issue, in particular Professor Amdahl (Jørgen Amdahl, Professor of NTNU), who, based on the underwater footage, managed to calculate the magnitude of the impact force which would lead to the formation of a hole of this size.

Professor Amdal concluded that the impact force on the starboard side of "Estonia" corresponded to a value of 500-600 tons. To illustrate the result more clearly, he gave two simple examples: such damage could be caused by a small ship with a displacement of 1000 tons moving at a speed of 4 knots, or a ship with a displacement of 5000 tons at a speed of 1.9 knots. The appearance of a hole of this size from the collision of "Estonia" with its own visor, Professor Amdal considered to be unlikely.

However, I see no reason to dismiss such a scenario. I will show that it was the collision with the visor that led to these consequences, even though the visor weighs only 56 tons, and the visor’s speed at the time of the collision with the ship was close to zero.

What points towards the conclusion that it was the visor that made that hole while striking “Estonia” under an acute angle from behind the ship? Well, a variety of different factors. First, I will explain how a stationary floating visor, that “Estonia” impacted with its starboard side, managed to hit the ferry at an acute angle, in the direction of the bow of the ship. For most people, this would not be obvious, but the answer lies in the behaviour of a typical triangular prism. What happens if you try to put a prism onto one of its edges? It will not be able to stand on it and will fall onto one of its faces. Whether the prism will fall to the right or the left, depends only on its deviation from the centre of mass.

A theoretical, perfect, floating prism, capable of rising to the surface strictly vertically in undisturbed water, at the moment of an impact with an obstacle, will also turn toward the obstacle with one of its faces - left or right. Moreover, the "choice" of the face will be completely random, and unpredictable.

The result will become predictable, if the rising prism, each time will encounter a moving surface with one of its edges. Certainly, there is a possibility that the prism, even when its edge encounters a moving solid surface, will fall onto the “wrong” face, but the probability of such an outcome is infinitely small, taking into account the conditions and forces acting on the prism (impact with the surface, the direction of the flow along the surface).

A visor of a ferry, disregarding a few obvious differences, behaves like one of these prisms. The stem of the visor is the edge of this theoretical prism, and its sides are two equilateral faces of the prism. Having a drift towards the right (sliding with the starboard side forward), swaying on the waves, in the longitudinal and transverse directions, "Estonia" came into contact with its moving hull with the stem of the visor (the edge formed by its sides), which led to its partial rotation around its axis clockwise.

Continuing to move forward, vigorously shifting from side to side (with a high angular velocity), in a stormy sea, "Estonia", rammed with its starboard side the floating visor. The visor at this moment “stood up” almost vertically. The narrow and lighter lower part of the visor was at the top, and the heavy, wide upper part went down. With all of its weight, from its full swing, "Estonia", which had a speed of 14 knots (almost 26 km/h), crashed into an almost motionless visor. This was the second strong metal strike on the starboard side of the ship, which was heard by some surviving passengers of this tragic cruise.

"Estonia" hit with its starboard side the central edge of the visor (partially the right side of the visor) the visor acted as if it was a sharp, immovable rock. Even though the visor had a small mass, being in the water it also had significant hydrodynamic resistance, as well as the inertia of rest. Together, these factors resulted in the visor being essentially unmovable. If anyone thinks that these conditions were not enough (high speed of the vessel, inertia, and hydrodynamic resistance of the visor) to cause such large-scale damage to the ferry, then for such people I would recommend an educational visit to a pool. Go to the nearest pool, which has a jumping tower, and do a jump from this tower a couple of times into the water. Jump from the same height with your feet forward. At first, jump into ordinary, still water. Then make things a little different - put onto the surface of the water, at the point of your entry into the water, a sheet of plywood with a thickness of only 2-3 mm and an area of ​​0.5-0.8 m² (as an option - a sheet of corrugated cardboard). If your eyes don't fail you, and you hit the floating sheet with your feet, then you will immediately understand how wrong you were - a serious leg injury will tell you this. Therefore, before executing such a jump, make sure that there are people in the pool who will help you get out of the water and will call emergency medical help. You will need it, no doubt.

We should not forget that the visor, and in particular its stem (central part), considering its design, has much greater strength than the side of the ship, so it is not surprising that the ship was pierced by it with ease. Taking into account all the existing factors, namely, the mass and speed of the ship, the position of the visor relative to the starboard side, the mass of the visor and its significant hydrodynamic resistance, large waves, the high angular velocity of the transverse and longitudinal oscillations of the ship, a small contact area providing high single point pressure, the high strength of the visor’s stem, all of this together, with absolute certainty, allows us to conclude that it was the detached visor of "Estonia" that pierced the side of the ship in such a way and on such scale.

In the photo below, you can once again see the specifics of the design of “Estonia’s” visor. Pay attention to the strongback running along the centre of the visor (the line connecting the left and right sides).

The visor of “Estonia” (1987, Viking Sally).

In the next two photos, you can see with ease the damage that the visor experienced from the impact it had with the starboard side of “Estonia”. The type of damage discovered on the starboard side of “Estonia”, as well as the damage on the right side of the visor (the asymmetrical triangle), allows us, with a high degree of certainty, to conclude that the extensive damage both of them sustained, is linked.

The damage to the right side of the visor has a peculiar triangular shape.

Given the average height of a person, it is not difficult to estimate the approximate length and width of the dent in the visor. The estimated length of the dent is approximately 3 meters, and it has a width of 1 meter. The estimated width of the dent on the hull of the ferry was found to be 1.2 meters, with a length of 4 meters. It should be understood that the 4-meter length of the hole is the sum of the lengths of the immediate point of impact of a triangular shape and a narrowing crack diverging upwards and downwards. If "Estonia" had been raised, then everyone would be able to see how much the dent on the visor corresponds to the hole in the ferry’s side.

A shot from the documentary “Estonia: a discovery that changes everything”.

The approximate size of the dent on the visor can be determined using an average high of a person.

The visor, after it pierced the hull, straight away allowed the water to enter the ship. The incoming seawater immediately began to spread along the starboard side of the ship, contributing to the increase of the starboard list the ship had (weight pulling down the starboard side increased at the maximum transverse distance from the longitudinal centre line of the ship). Moreover, due to its shape and size, the visor, which was now resting against the bottom of the starboard side, began to exert significant hydrodynamic resistance, thereby increasing the starboard list. In fact, at the initial stage, the ship did not list smoothly, as the lower decks flooded, but started to list abruptly, at a discrete angle.

The visor, having punched a hole through the hull, remained pressed against the starboard side of the ship due to the incoming flow of water. Since the visor itself was not pierced through, and it did not get stuck inside the ship’s hull, the incoming flow of water started to move the visor along the hull towards the stern. At the same time, the visor turned around its vertical axis, slid along the hull, and mercilessly scratched the starboard side of “Estonia”. It was the sliding of the visor along the starboard that gave rise to the sounds that were perceived by some passengers as the ship "going through the ice".

The visor sliding along the starboard side of the ship could scratch or even cut the plating a bit closer to the stern. This damage should have looked like a narrow cut-torn horizontal crack, and exactly such a crack-like hole was found on the starboard side of the ship in the area indicated in the photo below (orange line 2, photo from the survey report of the ship, 2019).

A thorough study of the visor would help to establish which part of it could have left such a cut on the hull of “Estonia”.

You can imagine that the visor remained motionless for some time, as it could have got caught against the protruding right roll stabilizer. However, this assumption should be considered only as potentially possible since the investigation did not come to any definite conclusions regarding the condition of the roll stabilizer, nor its usage by the crew. Damage that can be found on the right roll stabilizer won’t necessarily indicate a collision with the visor, since it could have been damaged upon the impact of the ship with the seabed.

The visor pressed against the hull caused increased hydrodynamic resistance from the starboard side. Not only was it maintaining the ship's right list, which allowed for more seawater to enter the vessel, but it also could have changed the ship's course.

It was the submerged white visor moving along the starboard side of “Estonia” that Karl Erik Reintamm saw when he ran out onto the deck that fateful night. It was over the visor floating in the sea that the dark waves of the Baltic Sea were rolling over. It was the partially submerged part of the bow of the ship, painted white, that created this optical illusion in the form of a “submarine”. Not a single fleet, not a single army in the world has a white submarine. All submarines are black or dark grey. The white colour would unmask them and therefore is not used in the Navy.

As the creators of the film “Estonia: a discovery that changes everything” point out, the hole found on the starboard side is located approximately 55-65 meters from the bow. Based on the ship's speed of 14 knots (7.2 meters per second), as well as taking into account the dimensions of the visor, it is possible to calculate with relatively high accuracy that between the first blow (the impact of the detached visor on the hull during the fall) and the second blow (the moment of the visor piercing the hull) there was a gap of 7-9 seconds. After another second or two, there was a distinct rattle. This rattle lasted from 5 to 10 seconds.

So, the general development of the situation had the following dynamic sequence. "Estonia", initially having a slight list to starboard, entered the stormy sea. Waves and wind were hitting “Estonia” from the port side. Because of this, “Estonia” was sailing with a right drift and a list of 4 degrees towards the starboard and was pitching considerably due to strong waves. The ship was sailing at a relatively high speed of 14-15 knots (considering the weather conditions). At some point, the locks of the visor snap off under the pressure of strong waves hitting the ship. A bit earlier or a bit later, the left swivel breaks. The right hinge of the visor breaks when the ship's bow collides with another large wave. The last to fail are the hydraulic actuators of the visor. A wave knocks the visor to the right, towards the starboard. The visor, while hitting the starboard side of “Estonia”, falls into the sea. However, it does not sink, but only briefly submerges in the sea, since a significant amount of air is trapped underneath it. After 2-4 seconds of being submerged, the visor resurfaces.

Since “Estonia” was sailing with a right drift, the visor ended up in the ship’s path. The contact between the visor and the bottom of the ship rotates the visor and lifts it up. “Estonia” having high speed and high pitching amplitude, hits the stem of the visor with its hull, as a result of which a large hole is formed in the starboard side of the ferry. This collision happens after 7-9 seconds after the visor separates from the ferry. The visor, pressed against the starboard side of the ship, to its hull, due to the significant hydrodynamic resistance exerted by it, causes a sharp and well-noticeable list towards the starboard. Since the ship carried on moving at the same high speed, the oncoming flow of water started to move the visor along the hull towards the stern. Due to the large area and high speed of the oncoming flow of water, the visor was strongly pressed against the hull of "Estonia" and, in the process of sliding along the hull, could have caused more damage to the plating with one of its protruding parts. In the end, the oncoming flow of water separates the visor from the ship and the visor sinks. After the sinking of the visor and the disappearance of the additional hydrodynamic resistance that it was causing, the list of "Estonia" did not decrease. This is because the seawater was continuously flooding the ship. The water was spreading along the starboard, as well as quite high up the hull, shifting the vertical center of gravity more and more towards the top right. Even though it was a relatively small weight, it was distributed fatally, quickly changing the situation from dangerous to critical. Taking into account the water entering through the ramp (partially open), the fully filled left ballast tank (it was not possible to compensate for the list by adding more water to the left ballast tank), the incorrectly loaded cargo, the pressure caused by wind and waves, the speed of the ship, erroneous actions of the crew, displacement of poorly secured cargo - all of this together led to such rapid and unexpected capsizing and sinking of the vessel.

I would like to remind you that “Estonia” always had a sizeable starboard list straight after it has been manufactured. This was found during the tests on the 11^th of January 1991 in Turku. The tests have shown that to compensate for shifted toward the starboard ship's center of gravity, the left ballast tank must be filled with 115 tons of water (the total volume of the ballast tank is 183 tons). This leaves only 68 tons to be used for any additional list that the ship would possibly have. This leads to one unpleasant conclusion - a noticeable starboard list can be caused by only tens of tons of water that got inside the ship and accumulated at the starboard. Since even at the time of leaving the port of Tallinn, the ship already had a slight starboard list, the water flooding inside the ship, naturally and inevitably, was distributed exactly along the starboard, continuously and quickly increasing the ship's starboard list.

In the final report, in section 3.2.5 Ballast system, you can find the following: “The list that could be compensated for with one heeling tank full and the other empty was about eight degrees. The connecting valve between the heeling tanks was designed to close in case of failure of electrical power”. I would like to highlight that if 183 tons of water could compensate for a list of 8 degrees, then the opposite is also true.

Taking into account the specifics of the design of the ballast system, as well as the fact that the crew had to act in a difficult stressful situation, you would hope that the connecting valve between the ballast tanks remained closed and was not accidentally opened by one of the crew members.

The displacement of the cargo towards the starboard is another significant factor that led to the rapid capsizing and sinking of the ferry. Heavy trucks that were released could have easily punched through the hull of “Estonia”. Such an event is logical and easily predictable. Furthermore, for such a fatal event to occur, you would only need a list of slightly over 30 degrees (taking into account the rolling). After being punched through by the trucks, the hole in the hull would further increase the rate of capsizing of the ship. The fact that the trucks are small compared to the ship should not mislead anyone. This statement is also true for the 40 and 20-foot steel shipping containers mounted on the truck trailers.

In 2021, the hole discovered by Henrik Evertsson’s expedition has once again appeared in the lens of the remote-controlled underwater robot. Some media outlets even tried to make a sensation out of this fact, stating that another expedition managed to find another unknown hole in the starboard of the ship. The fact that this is the same hole, can be easily proven by just comparing the footage from 2019 and 2021.

The high transparency of the water even made it possible to see the axle of the truck inside the ferry. Studying underwater footage, one can even conclude that individual fragments of the plating in the area of ​​the hole look like they are bent from the inside out. Of course, such damage to the hull may have well occurred and is most likely the result of a truck or freight container hitting the hull. However, there is a huge possibility that the above perception of these damages is, in fact, an ordinary optical illusion, which occurs because different fragments of the ship's plating are pressed inward to different depths. With such spatial position, the observer mistakenly perceives the least depressed fragments of the plating as “bent outwards”.

The hole discovered on the starboard of “Estonia” in 2019. Video footage from 2021.

It should be understood that this kind of holes (from the inside out), even if any will be found, are not the root cause of this disaster, but are only the result of it. The starboard list let loose heavy vehicles placed on the cargo car deck, and some of them managed to crush or even break through the hull of “Estonia”.

An image from the report on Henrik Evertsson’s expedition.

The small distance to the hole from the sea surface indicates that water could enter the ferry through this hole even at minimal list angles and wave heights.

But that's not the only problem. The critical factor is that the hole in question (the rapture of the starboard plating) was not only punched through quite low in the ship’s hull but was actually reaching the waterline and was even going underwater. This means the water started flooding under the vehicle deck immediately after the hull has been breached.

Destroyed fender and a hole extending from the lettering “ESTLINE” towards the waterline. For better clarity, the image has been flipped 180 degrees vertically.

Again, I would like to highlight, that the team of Henrik Evertsson initially incorrectly determined the location of the discovered hole. According to a report prepared on the results of their expedition, the location of the hole was determined to be on the starboard at a point located between the letters “N” and “E”, slightly below the lettering “ESTLINE”. In reality, this hole is located further aft and is located between the letters “S” and “T”. A sheet of A4 paper folded in a certain way demonstrates this perfectly.

An image from the report on Henrik Evertsson’s expedition. The red cross (1) indicates the supposed location of the discovered hole.

The most likely location of the discovered hole based on the specifics of the lettering.

Most likely, it was the fender, running along the side below the “ESTLINE” lettering, that was the part of the ship that left a dent on Estonia’s visor with a clearly defined horizontal edge (up to the frame). Again, the most significant damage to the hull of the "Estonia" happened in the area of ​​the fender, precisely because this is the most protruding part of the hull, which took on most of the force from the impact.

A well-defined horizontal line of deformation of the starboard side of the visor (indicated by red arrows), this is the result of the visor hitting the ship's fender (+ the presence of a horizontal frame inside the visor).

Estonia's (Viking Sally) fender and the most likely location of the discovered hole.

Complete traceological match between the damages on the hull and the visor.

Since, for obvious reasons, neither Sherlock Holmes, Hercules Poirot, nor Agatha Christie could take part in the investigation of this disaster, this relatively simple case quickly lost touch with reality. What is the cause of this? Well, the fact that conclusions that most experts insist on do not follow basic logic and contradict the laws of physics. Let us start for example with the buoyancy of the visor. The answer to the question "Can a visor stay buoyant?" sounds completely different from what the experts insist on. According to their assessment, the visor cannot stay afloat, and they are adamant about this fact. According to the assessment done by the Hamburg University of Technology (TUHH, Germany), the internal volume of the visor is only 19 m³ (Final report. Appendix 34.11.437). Experts claim that this volume is not enough for a visor weighing 56 tons to stay afloat. And indeed, this is true. At the same time, none of the experts who took part in the investigation are bothered by the fact that just the area of ​​​​the rectangular opening of the visor, that is framing the ramp, is more than 40 m² (the area of ​​the ramp is 45.65 m², 5680 x 8280mm). Nobody considers it paradoxical that 1 m³ of the internal volume of the visor can hold up to 10 tons of seawater. 10 tons of water per 1 m³ is considered unsurprising and normal by those who were working on this case, as well as those who subsequently familiarized themselves with its findings.

For the 56-ton visor to stay afloat, it would need at least 56 m³ of air. The following physics principle comes into play: 56 tons of steel = 56 m³ of air (56 tons of steel = 56 tons of water = 56 m³ of water = 56 m³ of air). 56 m³ is not as big of a volume as it would seem. Yes, there are no separate-enclosed sections or voids inside the visor that could contain such a volume of air, but, as I mentioned earlier, the visor itself has a relatively large volume. Based on the information presented in the final report, the source of which is not specified, the total internal volume of the visor is approximately 240 m³, which is more than 4 times the volume that air needs to occupy to ensure positive buoyancy of the visor (240/56=4,29). This means that there are no theoretical restrictions that would fundamentally prohibit the visor from staying afloat.

The highest water level indicated on the diagram corresponds to a weight of 165 tons and should occupy a volume of almost 165 m³. At the same time, the internal volume of the visor is only 19 m³ (calculation by TUHH).

The main question is whether there is such a spatial position of the visor, relative to the plane of the Earth's surface, in which 56 m³ of air or more will remain inside the visor, and at the same time the visor will be in a sufficiently stable position for at least some time. With a high degree of probability, it can be assumed that such a spatial position exists, but an exact answer to this question can only be obtained practically! It is necessary to conduct an experiment using the visor of "Estonia" itself.

The most likely position of the visor in the water would provide positive buoyancy and stability. In this position, the rotating beams of the visor would act as counterweights, stabilizing it in the specified position and preventing the waves from tipping the visor over.

The conclusion of the investigation regarding the scenario of the destruction of the visor’s hinge beams also invokes scepticism and doubt. Experts believe that the hinges snapped because forces were acting on them in the direction of the stern (backward and up). This idea itself, based on damage, seems reasonable, but experts highlight that such a direction of the acting forces arose only at the moment when a force pulling the visor forward and down appeared.

Broken hinges of the visor’s left hinged beam.

Broken hinges of the visor’s right hinge beam. The direction of the force that destroyed the metal hinges was towards the stern (backwards and up).

Hinges of the beam snapped backward and up, because the acting forces were pulling the visor forward and down.

Because the weight of the visor itself was not enough to brake the hinges in such a way, as additional conditions, contributing to forces acting upon the visor (in the forward and down direction), the authors of the report propose the existence of large quantities of water inside the visor itself (the visor was not watertight), as well as the added weight of the water on the visor’s deck (1-meter layer of water), which resulted in the total weight of the visor exceeding 200 tons and took into account the vertical acceleration of the ship’s bow. Experts are insisting on this exact scenario of the destruction of the hinges (a combination of excess mass and acceleration), even though the sum of all these factors acting simultaneously and in one direction is hardly achievable in real conditions.

Illustration of the destruction of hinges that was proposed by the experts.

The mechanism behind the destruction of the hinges, as well as the scenario of the separation of the visor from the ship, considering all the conditions, was completely different. For the hinges to collapse in such a way, the force acting on the visor must have been directed up and backward and not forward and down (version of experts). The problem is that engineers think of the hinged beam as that of a rigid rod and explain the breaking of the hinges through its function. But in the case of the destruction of the hinges, it only partially acted as a rigid rod. The fact is that each of the beams of the visor, in addition to its swivel hinges, had one more point of rotation (fulcrum). This pivot point (fulcrum) was where attachment loops of the hydraulic actuators were located. It was the hydraulic actuators that turned the visor beams into a classic lever, in which the hinges of the beam became the points with the most stress (with the upward/aft direction, indicated as the force F₁ in the picture below).

The actual cause of the destruction of the hinges.

The hydraulic actuators were mounted at a distance of 1.3 meters from the visor’s pivots. This part of the visor’s beam acted as a shorter arm of the lever. The long arm is the continuation of the beam towards the bow, including the deck of the visor itself. The aspect ratio in this lever was approximately 1:6 (the lack of data does not allow us to specify this ratio more precisely). This means that to equalize the forces at both ends of the lever, it was necessary to apply a force 6 times less (!) to the end of the long arm of this lever than to the end of the short arm.

Regarding the durability of the hinges the final report states the following: “The lugs of one hinge assembly (two plates) would then, according to simplified assumptions and calculations, have had a load-carrying capability in aft-directed tension of maximum 2.7 MN, using an ultimate tensile strength of 450 N/mm2, verified during actual testing. With the minimum cross-sections of the rims at yield in a welded assembly, their contribution to ultimate strength in aft-directed tension would be 1.5 MN”.

Based on the principles of the lever and taking into account the ratio shown (1:6), it turns out that breaking the hinges, requires applying a force in the range of 0.25 - 0.45 MN to the end of the long arm (for tensile strengths from 1.5 MN to 2.7 MN, the weight of the visor, with or without water, is not taken into account). Moreover, the presence of water inside the visor was a blessing. This additional mass generates a compensating momentum, which at least partially offsets the vertical wave load (from bottom to top) transmitted to the hinges of the beam.

The hydraulic actuators of the hinged beams were in the zero (closed) position and were hydraulically blocked and were experiencing stretching tension (were taking on vertical stress from the direction of the sea). The vertical force needed to break the hydraulic actuator mount attached to the hull, was estimated at 4 MN to perhaps as little as 2 MN (the port side hydraulic actuator was torn off the deck together with the entire mount, without destroying the hinges, the photo is below). That is, the hinges of the hydraulic actuators withstood higher stress than the beam hinges, which, naturally, broke first!

At the same time, the waves were able to break the hinges of the beam of the visor only when all the locks, that were holding the visor in the closed position, were broken. This could have happened simultaneously with the failure of the locks or after it. After the hinges of the beams snapped, the visor was kept from falling into the sea solely by its hydraulic actuators, which were still mechanically connected to it.

Mount of the lower hinge of the hydraulic actuator of the visor’s left beam.

But experts did not manage to understand this. Based on the conclusion of experts from the Finnish company MacGREGOR OY, who examined the hydraulic actuators of the visor, the investigation concluded that the high pressure inside the hydraulic actuator of the left hinged beam arose because one of the crew members turned on the hydraulic pump (pressed and held the "Close visor" button), thereby trying to keep the visor in the closed position. Hydraulic pumps installed on “Estonia” were new and powerful. The visor’s hydraulic pump could deliver a pressure of 400 bar, and the hydraulic actuators were initially tested at a pressure of 350 bar (the old pump could only deliver a pressure of 250 bar). After replacing the pumps, no one tested the hydraulic system at 400 bar, so the experts considered that the reason for the failure of the hydraulic actuators of the left hinged beam was connected precisely with the increased power of the hydraulic pump. It was not the new and powerful pump that broke the hydraulic actuators, but Pascal and Archimedes, and to do so they did not need any help from the crew. The build-up of high pressure inside the hydraulic actuator of the beam, which led to the damage to the left hydraulic actuators, is the result of compression of the hydraulic fluid by the piston at the moment when the bow of the ship was immersed in water and the water pressed on the visor from the bottom up.

The pressure exerted by the waves was taken on by the pistons of the hydraulic actuator, through the beams of the visor, which acted as levers. This led to an inevitable increase in pressure above the piston (between the piston and the stem seal). It was the strong compression of the hydraulic fluid by the piston (reaction of the fulcrum), and not the operation of the hydraulic pump at all, that caused the deformation of the piston and squeezed out the oil seal of the left hydraulic actuator rod. Thanks to the hydraulic actuators (after the destruction of the visor locks and hinges of the hinged beams), the visor could move vertically (open/close), and to a lesser extent in the longitudinal (stern - bow) and transverse directions (starboard – port). The hinged beams of the visor were no longer above deck C (deck No. 4) at a height of several centimetres, but were laying with their underside directly on deck C. The hinged beam of the visor continued to work as a lever, only now it was not acting as a lever of the first order as in the case of the destruction of the hinges of the beam, but a lever of the second order. The fulcrum in this system were the upper hinges of the hydraulic actuators, and the point of the input force were the bow of deck C (deck No. 4) and the front bulkhead.

Moving back and forth and up and down, the visor cut the bow of deck C and the front bulkhead with the underside of its hinged beams (deck No. 4). Hitting the forepeak deck, the lower part of the visor crumpled more and more (the visor was crumpled up by about 0.5 m compared to the original shape), which led to a deeper embedding of the visor beams into the front bulkhead. This process took some time, and the described destruction occurred in several cycles of such movement of the visor. The hydraulic actuators continued to keep the visor from falling into the sea, but they were already moving relatively freely.

Schematic that is showing the damage to deck C (no.4) and the front bulkhead on both sides of the ramp.

Traces on the lower sides of the visor beams, as well as traces on the deck and the forward bulkhead of the ship, indicate exactly this scenario!

Unfortunately, it is not possible to understand one of the key points of the hydraulic actuator system design, since the schematic diagram of the visors hydraulic system is given in the report only in a general form. Based on the information provided and considering the general logic of the operation of such hydraulic systems, it can be assumed that the hydraulic actuators of the visor had two independent circuits – upper and lower. The upper circuit is a part of the hydraulic system above the piston (in the rod area). The lower one is under the piston. If it was necessary to raise the visor, then the hydraulic fluid under high pressure was directed to the lower part of the hydraulic cylinder, i.e., under the piston, thereby pushing the piston up. At the same time, the hydraulic fluid was squeezed out of the upper part by a rising piston and flowed freely through the return pipe into the hydraulic tank. If the visor had to be closed, then the pressure was created in the upper part of the hydraulic cylinder, i.e., above the piston, which caused the piston to descend. Considering the visor's own weight, the lower circuit was equipped with special valves to regulate the rate of fluid outflow from under the piston, maintaining the pressure under the piston at a sufficiently high level. This eliminated the possibility of abrupt closure of the visor and prevented damage to the visor and its actuators.

The visor was equipped with two identical actuators separated from each other by some distance. It can be assumed that the entire main functional part had the following structure: both upper circuits and both lower circuits of the hydraulic actuators were first combined into one joint upper (red) and one joint lower (blue) circuit, and only after that the resulting two hydraulic circuits were connected to the power and control system.

In other words, the top of the left and top of the right hydraulic cylinders were a system of communicating vessels, and so were their lower parts. The separation into two independent channels "left side – right side" in this hydraulic system was probably not planned. This means that when the upper oil seal of the left hydraulic actuator was squeezed out (the visor beams acted as levers of the first order) and the left hydraulic actuator, having lost its tightness, became movable, the right hydraulic actuator also unlocked. Hydraulic fluid through the tubes of the upper circuit began to flow from the right hydraulic cylinder to the left and then outwards. The missing upper oil seal of the left hydraulic cylinder no longer performed its function and did not hold the entire system under pressure. The remaining oil in the system for some time still had some resistance on the hydraulic actuators, at the time of opening and closing the visor, but each time this resistance was weaker and weaker. It was the sound of unlocked and freely moving hydraulic actuators that the passengers in the front cabins of the ship heard.

Sticking out above deck C (at a height of 1.2 meters), the top of the ramp, was another element that kept the visor from falling into the sea. Ramp locks, with proper and full usage, could keep the ramp closed with a maximum force of 120 tons.

The visor that shifted forwards was able, as a result, to bend and slightly open the top of the ramp. The water flowing down deck C (from the superstructure to the bow), through the gap formed, began to get inside the car deck even at the time when the visor was still on the bow of the ship.

Drawing made by the system engineer showing what he saw in the surveillance monitor (Final report).

After the hydraulic actuators of the port side hinged beam was torn off the deck, the oil lines connected to it also got damaged. This may have led to air entering the lower circuit of the cylinder of the actuator of the starboard hinged beam, which is why the hydraulic actuator lost the ability to exert any hydraulic resistance and, under the influence of acting forces, was able to move along its entire length.

The freely moving starboard hydraulic actuator could no longer keep the visor from falling into the sea, and one of the waves threw the visor toward the starboard of the ship. While falling, the visor tore the starboard hydraulic actuator off the loops of its lower hinge (deck B), bending the hydraulic actuator rod by about 30 degrees.

The possibility that both hydraulic actuators were torn off the deck virtually simultaneously, i.e., because of the impact of one strong wave, should not be dismissed.

As for the loading ramp at the bow of the ship, it supposedly did not fully open during the disaster.

The results of bathymetric studies conducted by specialists at Stockholm University in July 2021 (research vessel "RV Electra"), despite the significant amount of data obtained, invoke surprise and raise questions. For example, highly debatable is the conclusion of experts that the features of the seabed observed near the ship were caused by the impact of "Estonia" with the seabed. Considering the fact that the stern of "Estonia" went underwater first and was first to reach the seabed (it was already on the seabed while the bow of the ship was still remaining on the surface), it would have been the area around the bow where the greatest number of sedimentary rocks would have been washed out and carried away by the underwater current.

During the sinking of the vessel, the water was pushed out from under the hull from the stern towards the bow, therefore, it was around the bow that this fast-flowing water would have washed out the greatest amount of sand and other small particles that form the basis of local sedimentary rocks. But the discovered deep longitudinal trench (up to 6 meters deep), encircling the vessel from the north and west, starts approximately from the middle of the vessel, that is, exactly where the hull of the ship rises most prominently above the local seabed relief. This does not give us information regarding the consequence of the impact with the seabed but hints toward the presence of a strong northern underwater current in this area. Moreover, an underwater Doppler radar (ADCP - Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler), installed on the seabed at some distance from the ship, revealed a rapid underwater current that cyclically changes its direction from north to south and back.

Experts, having familiarized themselves with this data, considered it erroneous. They assumed that ADCP had problems with the compass, which caused it to produce a significant error. The ADCP compass worked perfectly fine since the data obtained by ADCP on the direction of the underwater current completely correlates with the features of the seabed. The trench behind the stern and hull of "Estonia" is nothing more than the result of soil leaching by turbulent eddy currents formed by the rapid northern current.

Diagram of currents in the region of MS Estonia. Illustration taken from “EL21-Estonia Report of the MS Estonia shipwreck site survey with RV Electra”.

Turbulence (red arrows) induced by the local laminar separation. 3D modelling of MS Estonia. Illustration taken from “EL21-Estonia Report of the MS Estonia shipwreck site survey with RV Electra”.

Visualization of laminar and turbulent flows (Photo found online).

A stone in the surf zone and the result of the turbulent “activity” of the water. (Photo found online).

The smoother contours of the bow (compared to the central part of the ship and the stern), the deeper embedment of the bow into the seabed, and the fact that it is the bow of "Estonia" that first encountered the fast underwater northern current, are the set of factors that do not have a strong effect on the laminar flow and do not cause strong turbulent vortices at the bow of the vessel. Therefore, around the bow, at the north side of the ship, a similar situation is not observed (the trench is almost absent there).

Washing away the soil, the current deprives the stern of "Estonia" of support, which leads to the change of the tilt angle of the vessel. This, as a result, can lead to deformation (longitudinal bending) or twisting of the ship's hull. It is difficult to say how much the ship's tilt had changed after it reached the seabed, as the initial measurement of the ship's tilt was not done with good precision.

It is unlikely (due to the low pressure that the hull is exerting onto the seabed) that the damage found on the hull of "Estonia", the presence of which was recorded in 2019 using cameras mounted on a remote-controlled underwater robot, is the result of the impact on the bedrock. The solid seabed was exposed only years later and only after the sedimentary rocks covering it was eroded by turbulent flows and carried away by the current.

However, this should not be completely ruled out. The starboard side of "Estonia" could well have sustained a linear rupture in the area above/below any of the decks, including the car deck. A ship deck is a natural horizontal stiffener of the ship's hull and prevents it from crumpling inward. It is this circumstance that can lead to a similar linear (parallel to the deck) rupture of the plating, in the area above/below the deck, if in this part of the seabed there are individual protruding peaks of bedrock. Such damage to the hull is in no way connected with the sinking of the vessel, and its presence can be considered to have no effect.

What is especially amusing, is that the staff of the Department of Marine Geology at Stockholm University, assessing the results of their expedition, carefully ignored the basic physical properties of water in the Baltic Sea, which they have studied so diligently. Decades would still have to pass, and more than a dozen million euros would need to be spent before specialists finally understand all these simple and obvious truths. At the same time, the history of "Estonia" is not unique. Such a skewed understanding of reality is common among experts – for example, the Russian “Kursk”, or even the Malaysian “Boeing MH17”.

A detailed discussion of the technical condition of the vessel at the time of sailing, the actions of the crew before and during the disaster, and an assessment of the organization of the rescue operation are beyond the scope of this material and will not be discussed.

The reason why Sweden still refuses to raise the ferry and the dead, again is directly related to the lack of an answer from the authorities to the question "Why did it sink?". Neither the leadership of Estonia nor the leadership of Sweden are in possession of any information explaining the cause of the disaster. The authorities of these countries knew for certain that no vessel and no submarine had crashed into "Estonia". The illegal and undeclared cargo that was transported in the cargo bay of the ferry has nothing to do with the disaster itself. Absolutely nothing! The history of the cargo is one story, and the history of the ferry is another story. Yes, these two stories did converge at the same point, but there is nothing more to it.

You can investigate any of the circulating versions regarding the “secret” cargo of "Estonia", ranging from drugs to a nuclear bomb, but all of them, except one, are not significant enough to make the lifting of the ship politically impossible.

Any illegal and undeclared cargo, the transportation of which could have been related to the state (in this case Estonia and Sweden), would have been delivered to the Swedish port without problems and would have been accepted by the Swedish side. Sweden was waiting for this cargo, and none of those in power were going to sink the ferry because of it. At the same time, it makes no difference what cargo was being transported under the cover of the state (in this case, even two states) and with the participation of the state - drugs, cobalt, blocks of Soviet military electronics, ammunition or explosives, nuclear warheads. Any item from this list would have been paid for. Of course, it was a non-standard payment scheme, difficult to track, using only cash. No invoices or contracts confirming the transfer of ownership or the payment. Nevertheless, the transported cargo was purchased and was conditionally legally acquired. It was not stolen; it was paid for. During those years, it was the rule rather than the exception. The Soviet Union had already collapsed by that time, and many, with great joy, were engaged in looting. If Sweden, with the help of Estonia, was able to acquire something cheap - who is it a problem for? But the ferry carrying this cargo sank suddenly, quickly, and unexpectedly. The Swedish and Estonian authorities were aware that this happened for some unaccounted reason and this unaccounted reason could not be a ship or a submarine that accidentally crashed into the ferry. At the same time, everyone understood that the ferry could only sink so quickly if there was damage to the hull of the ship. Since external causes were completely excluded (collision with another vessel, above or under the water), it was obvious that the persons involved in the process realized that the cause of the demise of the ferry and people could be directly related to the undeclared illegal cargo transported by the state (large concerns are also part of the state). The hull and port sides of "Estonia" were intact. The uncertainty was regarding the starboard side. Given the position of the ship on the seabed, as well as the fact that the ship sank, drawing water from the starboard side, everyone was very concerned about the condition of this particular side. Questions: "Well, how is it? Is there a hole in it?" deprived many of sleep for many months. It is not difficult to understand why they were tormented by insomnia. There are a few simple questions that can help you find the answer. Could drugs have caused a hole to form in the starboard side? No. Could the blocks of Soviet military electronics have caused the formation of a hole in the side? No. Could cobalt have caused the formation of a hole in the side? No. Could a nuclear warhead have caused a hole in the side? No. Could an explosion of ammunition (mines, bombs, or missiles) cause a hole in the side? Yes! That is what everyone was afraid of. After all, no one understood why the ferry sank. The authorities of Sweden and Estonia wisely reasoned that if they lifted the ferry and a hole with the edges twisted outwards was found on its starboard side, not only would the cause of the disaster become clear to everyone, but it would also be clear who was responsible for it. And, of course, the authorities of these two countries - Sweden and Estonia - will be to blame for this. After all, they considered it possible to transport explosive cargo on a civilian passenger ferry. Do you think someone was ready to answer for it? To lose positions, titles, power, money, privileges and to go to prison? Of course not. That is why it was forbidden to approach the ferry, and even to extract the bodies of the dead from it. No one wanted anyone to have legal or moral grounds to dive into this ship and enter its interior. The only purpose of the committee dealing with the raising of the ferry, which discussed an exclusively ethical issue, was for its members to find arguments prohibiting the raising of the bodies so that no one would have grounds for diving to "Estonia", both in the present and in the future. No wonder this ship is still guarded by the military. All these actions were aimed only at ensuring that the cause of the ferry's demise, due to a possible internal explosion, could not be established in the next 50 years, enabling all participants in this illegal process to live happily and peacefully till old age and natural death. This sword of Damocles has been hanging over their heads all these years, and only the 2019 expedition and the analysis I did, took this threat away from them – there was no internal explosion on board the ferry. The hull of "Estonia" was pierced by its visor.

At the same time, of course, there are a lot of questions regarding the actions of the crew, the actions of people representing responsible state bodies (whose duties include monitoring the safe operation of ships), as well as questions to the shipowner, but there is no need to look for mysterious terrorists or a mystical submarine.

There is no doubt that the reason, for the demise of the ship and so many people, lies in the huge amount of big and small mistakes and miscalculations made by different people and at different times. The magnitude of these small, scattered errors eventually reached a critical mass, which "exploded" in the stormy Baltic Sea on the night of September 28, 1994.

* Using any material from the site without putting a reciprocal link is forbidden!

** LGBT engineers – engineers of non-traditional engineering orientation.

P.S. "A serious face is not a sign of intelligence, gentlemen. All the stupid things on earth are done with this exact facial expression" "The Very Same Munchhausen" (Mosfilm, 1979, directed by Mark Zakharov).

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